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RETURNING THE LANGUAGE
OF FAIRNESS TO EQUAL PROTECTION:
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG’S
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRUTTER AND GRATZ AND BEYOND
Shira Galinsky*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Like the opinions in many other recent equal protection cases,
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grutter v. Bollinger 1 and Gratz v.
Bollinger,2 the cases decided in June 2003 that challenged the University of Michigan’s affirmative action plans, are disturbing in
their mechanical, technical tone and seeming distance from real
life racial inequality. The language of equal protection analysis has
become regimented, fixed, and increasingly removed from the
problems of ignorance, intolerance, and outright racism that continue to plague American society. Against this backdrop, a minority
of Supreme Court justices have written about the need to depart
from the strict formalism of equal protection review and the need
to confront societal discrimination openly.3 Justice Ruth Bader
* Columbia University, B.A., 2000, CUNY Law School, Class of 2005. Many thanks
to Professors Frank Deale and Ruthann Robson for their feedback and comments.
Special thanks to the staff and editorial board of the New York City Law Review.
1 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3 Justice Marshall protested the oversimplification of equal protection review in
his dissent in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Justice Stevens has written in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring):
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. . . . It does not direct the
courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. . . . I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does
not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is
a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. I also suspect
that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular decisions
may contribute more to an identification of that standard than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms. It may therefore be appropriate for me to state the principal reasons which persuaded me to
join the Court’s opinion.
Id.
In Craig v. Boren, Justice Rehnquist opposed the subjective element of the tiers of
review, asking, “how is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to
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Ginsburg is notable among this group for her open and transparent discussion of societal injustice and racism, her encouragement
of similar openness and transparency in affirmative action programs, and her concrete suggestions for developing a more flexible
standard in reviewing equal protection cases. Ginsburg’s separate
opinions in Grutter and Gratz add a thoughtful articulation of the
anti-formalism position to the affirmative action debate by laying a
foundation in equality and human rights doctrine and advocating
for a less formalistic standard of review in these cases.
II.
A.

BEFORE GRUTTER AND GRATZ : THE SUPREME COURT’S
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ANALYSIS

Affirmative Action Review Under the Three-Tiered System

The Supreme Court currently views government actions that
differentiate between people based on their race with extreme suspicion. Under the Court’s strict scrutiny standard of review, laws
that treat people of one race or ethnicity differently from those of
another must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest in order to be deemed constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.4 This
standard of review has been used to strike down many malevolent
laws that discriminated against African-Americans, such as those
promoting school segregation and banning interracial marriage.5
After some initial uncertainty, the Court has decided that racebased affirmative action policies as well as race-based discriminatory policies should be subject to strict scrutiny because they differentiate among people according to their race and ethnicity.6
Initially, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, a case that indetermine whether a particular law is ‘substantially’ related to the achievement of
such objective, rather than related in some other way to its achievement?” 429 U.S.
190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the
Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 163-65
(1984).
4 The concept of strict scrutiny was first used with reference to racial classifications in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which held that the policy of
incarcerating individuals of Japanese descent during World War II was constitutional
because it responded to national security concerns. Strict scrutiny was subsequently
developed in a series of race-related cases. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding that an anti-miscegenation statute was unconstitutional because
there was no overriding purpose to the statute other than racial discrimination); see
generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1466-514 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the development of strict scrutiny for race-based classifications).
5 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
6 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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volved a challenge to the University of California’s plan to set aside
a certain number of medical school seats for minority students, the
Court ruled against the race-based affirmative action program, but
the Court did not issue a majority opinion, and it did not reach a
consensus on what standard of review to apply.7 Four justices wrote
that in order for race-based affirmative action programs to survive
constitutional scrutiny, the government policies must be substantially related to serving important governmental interests–one could
label such standard as intermediate scrutiny, although none of the
four justices had called it so.8 According to Justice Powell, however,
strict scrutiny should be applied to race-based affirmative action
programs, and achieving diversity, not remedying general societal
discrimination nor increasing medical services in minority communities, constituted a compelling state interest9–an element under
strict scrutiny. However, he stated that reserving a specified number of seats for minority students in an academic program, which
was the case in Bakke, was not narrowly tailored to achieving diversity.10 Thus, race or ethnicity could only be one among many
factors considered when making individual admissions
determinations.11
After Bakke, the Court continued to vacillate on the appropri7

438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978).
Id. at 359 (“[A] number of considerations–developed in gender-discrimination
cases but which carry even more force when applied to racial classifications–lead us to
conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9 Id. at 305-15. Powell wrote:
[T]he attainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right,
long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
Id. at 311-12.
10 Id. at 315.
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of seats in
each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable ethnic diversity in the student
body. But petitioner’s argument that this is the only effective means of
serving the interest of diversity is seriously flawed.
Id.
11 Id. (Justice Powell states that “[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner’s special
admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.” (emphasis in original)).
8
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ate standard to apply to race-based affirmative action, in part because of its ambivalence about the appropriate level of deference
to give to Congressional action. For example, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Court deferred to Congress and upheld a federal program
that granted government contracts to minority-owned businesses,
again without a majority consensus on the appropriate standard of
review to apply.12 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., however, the
Court ruled in favor of applying strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action programs and rejected the assertion that remedying
past general societal discrimination is a compelling state interest.
The Court held that a Richmond, Virginia, program that favored
construction contract grants to minority-owned businesses was unconstitutional.13 The Court, however, applied intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
a case that involved a challenge to a federal program that gave minority applicants preference for receiving television and radio
broadcast licenses.14 The Court deferred to Congress and held in
Metro Broadcasting that intermediate scrutiny applied to benign
race-based classifications, whether they aimed to remedy discrimination or promote diversity.15 Metro Broadcasting’s affirmative action program survived constitutional scrutiny under this standard
because promoting broadcast diversity was deemed an important
governmental interest and expanding minority ownership was considered substantially related to this goal.16 Thus, the affirmative action program met both elements of intermediate scrutiny.
However, the dissenting justices pointed out that Congress should
not receive extra deference nor should federal affirmative action
programs be reviewed under a different level of scrutiny as states’
12

448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980).
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial
context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our
task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch
charged by the Constitution with the power to provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States and to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
13 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that all classifications based on race are suspect and should be subject to the same standard of review regardless of the legislative
intent).
14 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
15 Id. at 564-65 (holding that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress, even if those measures are not “remedial,” are “constitutionally permissible to
the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
16 Id. at 567-68.
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programs.17 This seemingly was the case if one compares J.A.
Croson Co., involving a state statute reviewed under strict scrutiny,
and Metro Broadcasting, involving a federal statute reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, however, the Court reversed Metro Broadcasting to hold that, in the interests of applying
consistent standards to all race-based classifications, viewing all
such classifications skeptically, and applying congruent analyses to
Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment equal protection
cases, all race-based classifications were to be subjected to strict
scrutiny.18 Since then, the Court has continued to apply strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action programs. Although Justice
O’Connor wrote in the Adarand opinion that “we wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact,’”19 it
has nevertheless been difficult for race-based affirmative action
plans to survive such a stringent review.20
Gender classifications, unlike race-based ones, are subject only
to intermediate scrutiny review,21 and this standard has made it easier for gender-based classifications to survive equal protection review.22 Gender classifications, unlike race-based ones, were made
for the alleged purpose of “protecting” women rather than oppressing them. However, when Ginsburg argued a series of
landmark gender discrimination cases before the Court in the
1970s, she demonstrated that laws intending to award women special benefits based on stereotypical assumptions about their roles in
society only perpetuated those stereotypes.23 As a result, she advo17 Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection binds the Federal Government as it does the States, and no lower level of
scrutiny applies to the Federal Government’s use of race classifications.”).
18 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995).
19 Id. at 237.
20 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a law
school’s affirmative action plan that fashioned racial classifications furthered no compelling state interest).
21 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1561-77.
22 See Angela D. Hooton, Constitutional Review of Affirmative Action Policies for Women
of Color: A Hopeless Paradox?, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 391, 404 (2000) (describing how
gender-based affirmative action is more easily upheld than race-based affirmative action because it is subject to the less stringent intermediate scrutiny standard).
23 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex,
10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 821-22 (1978) [hereinafter Some Thoughts]. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), involved stereotype-based alleged benefits to women. In that
case, Ginsburg challenged a federal statute giving Social Security benefits presumptively to widows but not to widowers, who needed to prove their dependency. In Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Ginsburg argued that allowing women to buy beer at
age eighteen but requiring men to wait until age twenty-one was based on and perpet-
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cated that gender classifications that are constitutional should be
based on “real” sex differences, not stereotype-based distinctions.24
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide a gender-based affirmative action case under the Equal Protection Clause,25 and the
lower courts are divided on the appropriate standard for reviewing
such programs.26 The majority of the circuits apply the intermediate scrutiny test to gender-based affirmative action programs, making them easier to survive judicial review than the race-based
affirmative action programs, which are reviewed under strict scrutiny.27 While this distinction may make some sense in the universe
of legal logic, there is something perverse about the Court’s analysis of equal protection cases, and the distinction the Court has
drawn when reviewing race-based and gender-based affirmative action programs. The Equal Protection Clause was originally created
for the purpose of instituting racial equality28 and was only later
extended to gender issues;29 however, the Court’s analysis of cases
uated stereotypes about women. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), involved a
challenge to a policy that awarded survivors’ benefits automatically to women but not
to men. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), involved challenges to systems that
required men but not women to serve on juries. Finally, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974), involved a challenge to a Florida law giving a tax break to widows but not to
widowers.
24 See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977). In this case, compensating women for economic discrimination in the workplace was held to be based on a real
gender difference and not on stereotyping.
25 Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v.
Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1173
(1998). While the U.S. Supreme Court did decide a case that dealt with a genderbased affirmative action program, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), its
analysis was based on Title VII, not the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1173 n.27.
26 Skaggs, supra note 25, at 1174-75. The Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have used intermediate scrutiny for gender-based affirmative action, while the
Sixth Circuit uses strict scrutiny, despite its application of intermediate scrutiny to all
other gender-based classifications. See Engineering Contractors Ass’n v. Metro. Dade
County, 122 F.3d 895, 929 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a Florida “gender-conscious” affirmative action plan); Contractors Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based government affirmative action program); Coral
Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 931 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a government gender-based affirmative action program); Concrete Works of
Colorado, Inc. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1519 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that intermediate scrutiny should apply to the gender classifications in a government affirmative action program). But see Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989)
(finding that both race- and sex-based classifications must be narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny review).
27 Skaggs, supra note 25, at 1176.
28 Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the American People, 36 AKRON L. REV. 473, 479 (2003).
29 TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1561.
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under the Equal Protection Clause makes it easier to institute policies that promote gender equality than racial equality.30 Justice Stevens noted this anomalous result in his dissent in Adarand.31
B.

Ginsburg’s Departure from the Tiers of Review

Ginsburg’s equal protection analysis stands out against this
backdrop for its willingness to inject the language of fairness into
an area of law that has become all too dominated by legal formalism. Following Justice Marshall’s and Justice Stevens’s objections to
the use of three formal tiers of review,32 Ginsburg’s equal protection jurisprudence is characterized by a lack of willingness to compress a complex area of legal analysis into a three-tiered, overly
30

See id. at 1564.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Stevens’s dissent, he wrote that
today’s lecture about ‘consistency’ will produce the anomalous result
that the Government can more easily enact affirmative-action programs
to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact affirmativeaction programs to remedy discrimination against African-Americans–even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
was to end discrimination against the former slaves.
Id.
32 Justice Marshall, in his dissent in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), protested the oversimplification of equal
protection Review into two simple standards, writing that:
I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal protection analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two neat
categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review–strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court’s decisions in the field of equal
protection defy such easy categorization.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Stevens believed in only one standard of review, writing that:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever
criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at
least three such standards applies with the same force to a double
standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a
reasonably consistent fashion. I also suspect that a careful explanation
of the reasons motivating particular decisions may contribute more to
an identification of that standard than an attempt to articulate it in allencompassing terms. It may therefore be appropriate for me to state the
principal reasons which persuaded me to join the Court’s opinion.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Shaman,
supra note 3, at 163-65.
31
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simplified, all-purpose standard.33 She shies away from the prevailing tendency to divide equal protection review into three formal,
distinct tiers, believing that the Court has in reality used a much
wider range of review in analyzing different types of classifications.34 She has noted the absurdity of a three-tiered system that
makes race-based affirmative action plans that aim to remedy racial
inequality much more difficult to uphold than gender-based affirmative action plans.35 She has also criticized “endeavors to bundle the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection decisions into neat
packages under the headings [of] ‘strict scrutiny,’ ‘intermediate inspection,’ and relaxed or rational ‘relationship.’”36
Ginsburg’s opinion in United States v. Virginia (VMI) demonstrates her flexibility toward equal protection analysis.37 In that
case, women seeking admission to the all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI) challenged Virginia’s restriction of admitting only
men into VMI’s unique military style education as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.38 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that
the program was in fact unconstitutional and offered the state several options for curing the constitutional violation, including admitting women, establishing a separate program for women, and
privatizing the school, so that state action was no longer involved
33 On the other side of the affirmative action debate, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia
have also objected to the tiers of review.
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to
determine whether a particular law is “substantially” related to the
achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other way to
its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic
as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as judgments whether such
legislation is directed at “important” objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is “substantial” enough.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia has also criticized the tiers of review. United States v. Virginia (VMI),
518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argues in his VMI dissent that imposing restrictions on state activities by heightening equal protection analysis under the tiers of review is arbitrary, discretionary, and unnecessary, and longstanding practices not expressly prohibited by the Bill of Rights should not be prohibited by the Court under heightened equal protection review. Id. Despite this criticism
from both the left and the right, the tiers of review still survive.
34 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 20-21
(1975) [hereinafter Gender] (writing that “while formal invocation of two polar equal
protection standards continues, in a range of subject areas, lines in fact drawn by the
Court appear more variegated”).
35 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 270 (1999).
36 Id. at 269.
37 518 U.S. 515 (1996) [hereinafter VMI].
38 Id. at 520-24.
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and the school could have greater leeway to pursue gender-based
policies.39 Virginia chose to establish a separate school for women,
and VMI involved a challenge to the constitutionality of that plan.40
The plaintiffs argued that establishing a separate school was not an
adequate remedy because the separate school for women did not
have the same resources that VMI had, and it did not use VMI’s
strict “adversative method”–the refusal to use that method was
based on stereotypes about women.41
Despite Ginsburg’s earlier advocacy for the application of
strict scrutiny to gender-based classifications in her work with the
Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), in VMI, she declined to raise the standard of review for
gender-based discrimination to strict scrutiny. Ginsburg thereby
disappointed many feminist observers; she, however, did apply a
higher form of scrutiny to gender-based classifications than the
standard that had previously been applied by the Court. While
Ginsburg’s VMI opinion technically comports with precedent and
applies intermediate scrutiny to Virginia’s sex-based classification,
she heightens intermediate scrutiny by referring to it as “skeptical
scrutiny”42 and by requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” element, instead of the merely “important state interest,” one
previously mandated by intermediate scrutiny.43 Her opinion de39

Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526-27.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 531 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action. Today’s skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to
volumes of history.”). See also Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible
Path to Sex Equality: The Young Women’s Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 95, 105-06 (1997). Morgan notes that:
the majority opinion in United States v. Virginia did not announce a new
equal protection test for sex-based classifications, nor did it endorse an
abandonment of the traditional intermediate scrutiny test. The United
States v. Virginia opinion used the traditional statement of the intermediate scrutiny test interchangeably with a new phrase ‘skeptical scrutiny,’ and a less common–but not novel–formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny test which requires that parties who seek to defend sex-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly
persuasive justification’ for that action.
Id. (emphasis in original omitted) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
43 The “exceedingly persuasive justification” standard was initially introduced in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979), and the
Court later relied on the standard in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). For discussion on the
development of the standard see Elizabeth A. Douglas, Note: United States v. Virginia:
40
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parts from the rigid three-tiered system by elevating the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, yet falling short of strict scrutiny.
Some commentators attribute Ginsburg’s reluctance to raise
the standard of review for gender-based classifications to strict scrutiny to her desire to ensure a greater likelihood of success for affirmative action programs for women.44 Ginsburg has indicated
that she finds it problematic that the more demanding standard
for race-based discrimination makes race-based affirmative action
more difficult to uphold than gender-based affirmative action.45
She may therefore have been motivated by the desire that strict
scrutiny not be used to invalidate gender-based affirmative action,
as was the case for the race-based affirmative action in Adarand, a
case decided by the Court shortly before VMI.46 These concerns,
combined with Ginsburg’s willingness to depart from a strict threetiered system of review, may have contributed to her decision to
adopt a heightened standard of review for the gender-based classification at issue in VMI without applying strict scrutiny. Ginsburg’s
VMI decision displays an overall willingness to be flexible that transcends the formal and rigid tripartite system of categories of
review.47
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Adarand also reflects her flexibility with respect to equal protection analysis. She encourages
Gender Scrutiny Under an “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 26 CAP. U.L. REV.
173 (1997).
44 See Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination,
20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699, 755-58 (1998). Ellington et al. write:
In VMI, Ginsburg had the opportunity to advance her lifelong position
regarding judicial review of gender classifications. She argued for strict
scrutiny in the past; the United States sought strict scrutiny at oral argument; and she may have been able to win a majority of the Court. Perhaps though, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., strict scrutiny would work against minorities. Or
perhaps, a recent racial classification case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, had proven to be too dangerous to affirmative action. . . . Adarand
was undoubtedly on Ginsburg’s mind when she drafted the VMI
opinion.
Id.
45 See Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 270 (“Ironically, the less rigid standard
for sex classifications has led some decisionmakers to conclude that efforts to assist
women through affirmative action are less vulnerable to constitutional attack than
efforts to aid historically disadvantaged racial minorities. That, I think, is a most
troublesome notion.”).
46 See Ellington et al., supra note 44, at 756.
47 Justice Scalia criticized the VMI majority opinion’s reliance on the “exceedingly
persuasive” standard in his dissenting opinion in that case as an unjustified departure
from precedent and an unsubstantiated reading of the holdings in Hogan and J.E.B.
United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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deference to Congress,48 and although she writes approvingly of
the need for close review of affirmative action programs, she observes that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decision making, to
differentiate between permissible and impermissible governmental
use of race, to distinguish between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a
welcome mat,” as well as to prevent undue trammeling of the majority’s rights.49 Her proposed standard of review is much less strict
than the majority justices’, and she indicates that the program at
issue would survive it.50 Ginsburg’s dissent represents her effort to
highlight common ground with the other justices’ opinions while
striving to keep open the possibility that the Court would apply a
different standard to future affirmative action cases.51
Ginsburg has also voiced opposition to differentiating rigidly
between the standards for reviewing race-based and gender-based
classifications. Because there is no constitutional mandate for gender equality, Ginsburg, like many other advocates, relied in part on
analogizing gender-based to race-based discrimination when she
argued for heightened scrutiny of gender-based classifications
before the Supreme Court during her years working with the
ACLU.52 In Reed v. Reed,53 for example, Ginsburg contends that sex,
like race, is a suspect classification, and compares sex-based to racebased classifications, showing how both are based on and perpetuate discrimination.54 Ginsburg also grounds her VMI opinion in
part in the race discrimination line of cases by citing to Sweatt v.
Painter, pointing out the similarity between “separate but equal” arguments with respect to both race and gender discrimination, and
48 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 271 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
49 Id. at 276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 271; see also Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 629, 664-65 (2003).
52 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735,
739 (2002). Sullivan writes:
In the absence of gender-specific constitutional text, the story of constitutionalizing American women’s equality is a story of creative interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and of advocates’ bravado. Led with
inventiveness and strategic brilliance by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, litigating as a founding director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Women’s Rights Project, women’s rights advocates persuaded
the Court to read guarantees of sex equality into the Equal Protection
Clause by analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimination.
Id.
53 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54 Ellington et al., supra note 44, at 724.
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noting the lack of equality in the separate educational institutions
at issue in Sweatt and VMI.55 Elsewhere, she has noted that both sex
and race are immutable characteristics bearing no relationship to
ability to perform, and has suggested that suspect classes are in fact
characterized by immutable traits.56
At the same time that she emphasized the similarities between
race and gender to advance her goal of achieving heightened scrutiny for gender-based classifications, however, Ginsburg has also
recognized the inaccuracy of the analogy. While race and gender
are immutable characteristics (although both are more fluid than
is commonly acknowledged)57 and both have been the basis for
creating formal legal disadvantages in civic life, there are differences between the two categories.58 There is no sex-based segregation the way that there is race-based segregation, and women are
not a minority with respect to men.59 Furthermore, sex-based and
race-based discrimination have had different histories and motivations.60 Some commentators argue that there remains an inherent
difference between women and men with respect to child-bearing
while race is now widely considered to be a social construct.61
In addition, separating methods of reviewing race and gender
discrimination does not allow courts to account for the ways that
individuals’ identities overlap and for the fact that discrimination
can be based on a combination of factors. Discrimination against
Latina women, for example, can be different from that faced by
African-American men. Commentators on the subject have a tendency to discuss African-Americans and women, thus ignoring the
existence of African-American women.62 In contrast, Ginsburg has
experienced the phenomenon of intersecting identities and has attributed her difficulty in finding work as a lawyer in the 1950s to
55 See Ray, supra note 51, at 642; United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 553-54
(1996) (concluding that “[i]n line with Sweatt, we rule here that Virginia has not
shown substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities . . . at VWIL and
VMI”).
56 Ellington et al., supra note 44, at 725 n.220 (noting that Ginsburg differentiated
between legislative actions that distinguished between those based on need or ability
and those based on gender or race, or “another congenital trait of birth”).
57 See, e.g., KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF
US (1994).
58 Sullivan, supra note 52, at 742.
59 Id. at 742-43.
60 Id. at 744.
61 Id.
62 See generally Hooton, supra note 22; Serena Mayeri, Note: “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045
(2001).
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the discrimination she encountered as a Jew, a woman, and a
mother.63 Ginsburg’s equal protection analysis therefore shies away
from making sharp differentiations in the standard of reviewing
race-based and gender-based classifications. She recognizes the
problems, both practical and conceptual, in making these types of
differentiations.
Consistent with her overall approach to equal protection cases
and her alignment with a position that shies away from formal tiers
of review, Ginsburg’s affirmative action jurisprudence departs from
the Court’s prevailing formalism in equal protection analysis. She
argues that plans that employ racial classifications to remedy the
effects of discrimination against particular groups (affirmative action plans) should be subject to a lower standard than those that
aim to oppress (discriminatory plans).64 Contrary to the prevailing
trend, Ginsburg favors applying a similar standard to both racebased and gender-based affirmative action plans. She believes that
affirmative action is a necessary part of a comprehensive effort to
combat discrimination, and grounds this opinion in part in international law.65 Supported by human rights conventions to which
the United States is a party, Ginsburg claims that affirmative action
rectifies both civil and social inequalities and helps disadvantaged
groups achieve a measure of freedom within the societies that oppress them.66
When the Supreme Court issued its opinions on the University
of Michigan’s affirmative action plans in Grutter 67 and Gratz,68 Ginsburg wrote separately in both cases, concurring in Grutter 69 and
dissenting in Gratz.70 These opinions are striking examples of Ginsburg’s flexible approach to equal protection analysis and her willingness to rethink the entrenched tenets of prevailing equal
protection review.
63 See Malvina Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman on the United
States Supreme Court, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1441, 1446 (1998).
64 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (2003) (“This insistence on ‘consistency,’ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank
discrimination long reinforced by law. But we are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain
painfully evident in our communities and schools.” (internal citations omitted)).
65 See Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 255 (noting that “an ‘effective remedy,’
in the context of centuries of discrimination . . . must include at least some modes of
positive governmental action”).
66 Id. at 254.
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
68 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
69 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344.
70 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298.
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The most recent Supreme Court opinions on race-based affirmative action were Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, issued
in June, 2003.71 In these cases, white students who had been rejected from the University of Michigan’s law school and undergraduate college, respectively, challenged the use of affirmative action
for minorities in Michigan’s admissions process. They argued that
considering race in university admissions constituted an unconstitutional racial classification. The Supreme Court ruled against the
plaintiffs in Grutter 72 and in favor of the plaintiffs in Gratz.73 Both
cases were decided within the existing limited framework of applying strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action and requiring
such affirmative action programs to meet stringent requirements
in order to be considered constitutional.
The admissions systems that were challenged in the two Bollinger cases differed. In the undergraduate admissions policy at issue
in Gratz, applicants were awarded up to a total of 150 points based
on a variety of factors, including grade point average (GPA) and
standardized test scores.74 In addition, admissions officers awarded
points for “soft factors,” including in-state residency, leadership,
and participation in community activities.75 Candidates with more
than a certain number of points were admitted, others below a certain number of points were rejected, and those in the middle were
earmarked for additional, more individualized review.76 As part of
this system, members of underrepresented minority groups received twenty points solely because of their race or ethnicity.77
In Grutter, the law school admissions policy involved a more
individualized review than did the undergraduate policy in Gratz.
The law school considered applicants’ LSAT scores and GPAs, and
then reviewed other soft factors, including applicants’ letters of
recommendation, essays, and potential “contributions to the intellectual and social life of the institution.”78 An applicant’s race and
ethnicity could be included in this consideration.79 The school
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
Id. at 253-57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 316.
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aimed to achieve a diverse student body and to admit a critical
mass of minority students.80
A.

The Constraints of Diversity: The Majority’s Analysis in Grutter
and Gratz

The affirmative action policy at issue in Gratz was held to be
unconstitutional, and, while the Court ultimately ruled in favor of
the affirmative action plan in Grutter, both Gratz and Grutter adhered to conventional equal protection analysis. In both cases, the
Court applied strict scrutiny without delving particularly far into
the complexities of racial discrimination. The end-product of this
analysis is a set of opinions that seem strangely sanitized and removed from the reality of race relations in Twenty-First Century
America.
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Court affirmed that all racial
classifications, even those intended to benefit minorities, or those
in affirmative action programs, were subject to strict scrutiny.81 In
Grutter, the Court reiterated that, although some racial classifications were acceptable, strict scrutiny was necessary to identify and
reject those that were not.82 In order to be deemed constitutional,
Michigan University therefore had to demonstrate that its affirmative action plans met the strict scrutiny standard of being narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.83 The Court
followed Powell’s opinion in Bakke and concluded in both Grutter
and Gratz that achieving racial diversity in universities, especially in
light of the academic freedom accorded academia, was a compel80

Id.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (finding that “[i]t is by now well established that all racial
classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (holding that “all
racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”).
82 Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not
all are invalidated by it. . . . Whenever the government treats any person
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection. But that observation says nothing about
the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job
of the court applying strict scrutiny. When race-based action is necessary
to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
83 Id. at 326.
81

372

NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:357

ling state interest.84 However, it invalidated the undergraduate admissions policy, but not that of the law school, because of
differences in the schools’ respective affirmative action policies.
In Gratz, the Court concluded that the undergraduate admissions program’s practice of assigning points based on minority status was not narrowly tailored to achieving the compelling state
interest of diversity according to Powell’s conception of narrow tailoring, because it did not involve a sufficiently individualized review.85 The Court decided that the point system made admission
automatic for most minimally qualified minority students and
made race too decisive a factor in admissions decisions.86 According to the Court, the system placed minority students in one oversimplified category and failed to account for differences in students’ backgrounds.87 To achieve diversity, a narrowly tailored system would involve individualized determinations about particular
students, and the school would not admit a large group of minority
students with similar backgrounds.88 The Gratz opinion quotes
Powell’s statement in Bakke that “critical [admissions] criteria are
often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race
but sometimes associated with it.”89
In Grutter, however, the Court ruled that the law school’s more
individualized system of review, which did not establish a separate
admissions track for minorities and considered race and ethnicity
in the context of particular applicants’ other qualifications, was acceptable.90 Under this system, membership in an underrepresented minority group was a “plus” but was not decisive in
admissions decisions.91 The Court ruled that this admissions process was more consistent with the Powell opinion in Bakke, and it
constituted narrowly tailored means to achieve the compelling
state interest of diversity.92
84 Id. at 329 (finding that “[w]e have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition”).
85 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (referring to Justice Powell’s emphasis on considering
each applicant individually and assessing his or her qualities and ability to diversify
the class, and finding that the college did not provide a consideration of that type).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 273-74.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 272-73.
90 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
91 Id. at 334.
92 . . . [T]he Law School’s admissions program bears the hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly indi-
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In addition, the Court in Grutter ruled that the law school’s
goal of achieving a critical mass of minority students was acceptable.93 According to the Court, since diversity was a compelling
state interest and admitting a critical mass of minority students was
important to achieving the educational benefits of diversity, striving for a critical mass was satisfactory.94 The educational benefits of
diversity, according to the Court, included achieving cross-racial
understanding, breaking down stereotypes, and preparing students
for citizenship in a diverse society.95
Finally, the Court ruled that affirmative action programs
should not outlast the need for them, and they should include a
sunset provision with periodic reviews to ensure that they are retired once diversity can be achieved without them.96
Although the Court ultimately approved the affirmative action
plan in Grutter, the Court in both Grutter and Gratz discussed affirmative action only within the narrow constraints of the three-tiered
equal protection review. Its failure to concomitantly deal openly
and frankly with the gravity of racism and its effects on minority
students resulted in a glaringly incomplete discussion of affirmative
action. The Court decided that rectifying general societal discrimination was not a compelling state interest,97 so it was limited to
vidualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks. Nor can universities
insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from
the competition for admission. Universities can, however, consider race
or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.
We are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions program, like the
Harvard plan described by Justice Powell, does not operate as a
quota. . . .
Id.
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 330.
Id. at 328-31.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 342.
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978).
. . . [T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the
Davis Medical School perceived as victims of “societal discrimination”
does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.
To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for
violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout
the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we have never
approved.
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discussing affirmative action within the narrow constraints of either
remedying very specific institutional discrimination98 or, as in Grutter and Gratz, of achieving diversity. However, societal discrimination is at the heart of the need for affirmative action, and it is
doubtful that a discussion of affirmative action that leaves out such
an integral feature could yield a satisfying result.
B.

Ginsburg’s Approach: Transcending Formalism

In contrast to the majority opinions, Ginsburg’s dissent in
Gratz and concurrence in Grutter 99 are notable for their straightforward discussion of issues of justice and fairness, their encouragement of transparency in affirmative action programs, and their
flexible treatment of equal protection cases. In both cases, Ginsburg contributes an honest perspective on racial inequality that is
sorely lacking in the majority opinions, and demonstrates a corresponding flexibility toward equal protection review.
In Gratz, Ginsburg argues that using the same standard of review for all race-based classifications, including ones that attempt
to remedy the effects of discrimination rather than promote it, is
inappropriate.100 Instead, she urges that government decision-makers be allowed to distinguish between policies that burden groups
that are already victims of discrimination from those that strive to
remedy discrimination and its effects.101 Ginsburg contends that
race is a suspect category only because it has traditionally been
Id.
98 See, e.g., Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a police
department plan to promote minorities served a compelling state interest of rectifying
past discrimination within the department).
99 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter, 342
U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
100 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298.
[T]he Court once again maintains that the same standard of review controls judicial inspection of all official race classifications. This insistence
on ‘consistency,’ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of
rank discrimination long reinforced by law. But we are not far distant
from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of lawsanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and
schools.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
101 Id. at 302.
To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that
denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based
on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and
to undo the effects of past discrimination.
Id.
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used for the purpose of discrimination, not of remedying discrimination, and that the Constitution only prohibits classifications that
deny benefits, cause harm, or impose burdens, not those that correct inequalities.102 In addition, affirmative action in university admissions need not and does not impose an undue burden on white
students, as demonstrated by a study showing that the statistical
chances for the acceptance of white applicants are not significantly
diminished when there are a large number of places in a class and
many more white applicants than minority ones.103
Ginsburg’s Gratz dissent also cites studies and statistics demonstrating the racial inequalities in the United States that create a
need for government programs to promote equality.104 She describes the continuing racial disparities in employment, health
care, poverty rates, schooling, earnings, real estate transactions,
and consumer transactions, as well as the pervasive conscious and
unconscious biases that prevent true equality in all areas of society.105 Ginsburg further observes that permitting race-based classifications that promote, rather than hinder, equality is consistent
with international human rights doctrine.106 She endorses Michigan’s “fully disclosed,” point-based undergraduate affirmative-action plan because having an open plan is better than achieving
the same results surreptitiously, through “winks, nods, and
disguises.”107
The Gratz majority opinion asserted that close scrutiny of racebased classifications continues to be necessary because it is important to ensure that these classifications are not “in reality malign,
but masquerading as benign,” and that they do not unduly burden
members of the once-preferred groups.108 According to Ginsburg,
Michigan’s undergraduate policy would pass this test because the
policy genuinely aimed to rectify the effects of current and past
discrimination and there was no evidence of undue harm to non102

Id.
Id. at 303. “In any admissions process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of
admission facing white applicants.” Id. (citing Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:
Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049
(2002)).
104 Id. at 299-01.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 305.
108 Id. at 302.
103
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minority students.109
Similarly, Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter highlights support for her position drawn from international human rights doctrine that uses affirmative action to protect groups that have
historically been subject to discrimination and then discontinues
these programs once their objective of remedying discrimination
and its effects is achieved.110 Citing to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women,111 Ginsburg again emphasizes the persistence of
racial bias in that members of minorities still attend predominantly
segregated schools with fewer educational resources.112 She remarks somewhat skeptically that the Court could “hope . . . but not
firmly forecast” that affirmative action programs could be discontinued in twenty-five to thirty years because of the achievement of
nondiscrimination and genuine equal opportunity.113
Ginsburg’s opinions in Gratz and Grutter offer support for affirmative action in the persistence of discrimination and its effects
and consequently urge the application of a different standard of
review to remedial classifications than to invidious ones. Ginsburg
turns to international human rights doctrine to bolster her position. She advocates for a standard of review for affirmative action
that weeds out malign classifications masquerading as benign, without unduly burdening members of the majority. In addition, Ginsburg supports fully disclosed affirmative-action plans, but expresses
skepticism about the possibility of being able to sunset affirmativeaction plans in the near future.
IV.

THE ROAD AWAY FROM EQUAL PROTECTION FORMALISM:
GINSBURG’S CONTRIBUTIONS IN GRUTTER AND GRATZ

Ginsburg’s analysis of affirmative action in Gratz and Grutter
contributes several important points to the pro-affirmative action,
anti-formalism position. Ginsburg addresses issues of societal discrimination and racial injustice openly and transparently and advocates for similar transparency in affirmative action programs. She
also emphasizes the importance of international human rights doc109 Id. 302-03 (“[T]here [has not] been any demonstration that the College’s program unduly constricts admissions opportunities for students who do not receive special consideration based on race.”).
110 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 345.
113 Id. at 346.
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trine by partly grounding her argument in it. Finally, she offers
alternate standards of review that retain some of the conceptual
linchpins of equal protection analysis while dispensing with the excessive formalism of the Court’s prevailing equal protection review.
A.

Laying the Human Rights Foundation

The first striking aspect of Ginsburg’s opinions in Gratz and
Grutter is their grounding in an open discussion of societal discrimination and racial injustice. The Gratz and Grutter majorities maintain that, in the absence of particularized discrimination, racebased affirmative action may be justified by the state’s compelling
interest in promoting diversity.114 Ginsburg, however, supports affirmative action as necessary to fighting general societal discrimination, and uses international human rights doctrine, in addition to
United States precedent, to support her view.
In contrast to the Court’s rejection of affirmative action to
remedy general societal discrimination as a compelling state interest for race-based affirmative action,115 Ginsburg discusses the persistence of societal discrimination and its effects as justification for
affirmative action,116 and thereby suggests that affirmative action
should be grounded in the need to compensate minority groups
for societal wrongs committed against them. She writes that “[t]he
stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society
. . . and the determination to hasten its removal remains vital.”117
Ginsburg believes that general historic oppression itself constitutes
justification for adopting affirmative-action plans.
Consistent with her discomfort with the formal standards of
review relied on by the Court and with the Court’s refusal to lower
its standard of review for remedial race-based classifications, Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz does not dwell on diversity as a
114
115

Id. at 326-28.
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978).
. . . [T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the
Davis Medical School perceived as victims of “societal discrimination”
does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.
To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for
violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout
the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we have never
approved.

Id.
116
117

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-01 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 304.
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compelling state interest to justify affirmative action. Her concurring opinion in Grutter, while explaining that the qualifications for
a compelling state interest were not at issue because the majority
ruled that the affirmative-action plan satisfied strict scrutiny,118 discusses general societal injustice. In both cases, Ginsburg justifies
the need for affirmative action programs for disenfranchised minorities with statistics on the nationwide persistence of discriminatory attitudes and the lingering effects of past discrimination.119 In
order to pass constitutional muster, affirmative action should not
need to be justified as a means of achieving diversity; instead, the
general societal injustices committed against certain racial and ethnic groups should themselves provide sufficient justification for
taking remedial action.
Ginsburg’s position is drastically different from the majority’s
constrained view of what constitutes a compelling state interest, as
illustrated by her support for transparency in affirmative action admissions programs in higher education. Ginsburg writes that colleges should be allowed to rely on the more overt type of
affirmative action at issue in Gratz in response to the need for combating general societal discrimination. “One can reasonably anticipate,” she writes,
that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority
enrollment–and the networks and opportunities thereby
opened to minority graduates–whether or not they can do so in
full candor through adoption of affirmative-action plans of the
kind here at issue. Without recourse to such plans, institutions
of higher education may resort to camouflage.120

Ginsburg therefore encourages adoption of affirmative-action
plans as a direct response to historical oppression, which would
allow universities to be candid and overt in their reliance on such
plans.
To Ginsburg, affirmative action is an essential part of any effort to fight discrimination. Eliminating discrimination and its effects means both fighting discrimination itself and correcting its
consequences.121 Affirmative action, according to Ginsburg, advances both civil and economic rights by redressing the lingering
118

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-01; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345.
120 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276.
121 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 256-57. Ginsburg quotes U.S. President
Lyndon Johnson when he famously declared: “You do not take a person who, for
years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line
of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all the others.’ ” Id. at 255-56.
119
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effects of civil rights deprivation and by ensuring the economic and
social well-being of groups that experience disproportionate poverty, unemployment, and poor health.122
The human rights argument that Ginsburg advances in her
two Bollinger opinions is consistent with her wider perspective on
affirmative action and her belief that affirmative action is necessary
to achieve equality. Ginsburg’s use of international human rights
documents underscores her argument that basic fairness and transcendent, and universal principles of human decency require compensating minorities for social and economic wrongs perpetrated
against them. Ginsburg is also generally interested in promoting
comparative law and international law analysis in Supreme Court
cases, and her willingness to look to international and comparative
law for support for affirmative action stems from her belief that
doing so can help the Court navigate the difficulties of creating
effective affirmative action programs.123 While other countries
122

Id. at 254. Ginsburg writes:
Affirmative action stands at the intersection of these two complementary categories. Affirmative action aims to redress historic and lingering
deprivations of the basic civil right to equality, the legacy of slavery in
the United States, for example, or of the caste system long entrenched
in India. It was also conceived as a means to advance the economic and
social well-being of women, racial minorities, and others born into
groups or communities that disproportionately experience poverty, unemployment, and ill health. Focusing on affirmative action, we may better comprehend how the two classes of rights (civil and economic),
though once and still set apart by politicians, jurists, and scholars, commonly relate to promotion of the health and welfare of humankind.

Id.
123 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sherman J. Bellwood Lecture: Looking Beyond Our Borders:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(2003):
The United States was once virtually alone in exposing laws and official
acts to judicial review for constitutionality. But particularly in the years
following World War II, many nations installed constitutional review by
courts as one safeguard against oppressive government and stirred up
majorities. National, multinational, and international human rights
charters and tribunals today play a key part in a world with increasingly
porous borders. My message in these remarks is simply this: We are the
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from
others. That message is hardly original. A prominent jurist put it this
way 14 years ago: For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United
States exercising the power of judicial review [for constitutionality] had
no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts were
created after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, among other
sources, for developing their own law. But now that constitutional law is
solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States
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have looked to the United States in their affirmative action jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has not exhibited a similar willingness to use comparative and international law.124
Ginsburg cites two international human rights documents that
support the use of affirmative action as a measure for remedying
discrimination in her opinions in Grutter and Gratz: the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD)125 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).126 (The United States
has ratified CERD and signed but not ratified CEDAW.127) As Ginsburg has previously written, CEDAW aims to eliminate the
prejudices that assign women to certain roles, to create recognition
of common responsibility for childrearing, and to allow affirmative
action for women to speed up the process of achieving equality.128
CERD calls for special and discrete measures to ensure equal rights
and freedoms and the use of affirmative action when called for.129
Ginsburg grounds her analysis of affirmative action in Grutter
and Gratz in an open discussion of historical discrimination and its
effects as well as in international human rights doctrine in a way
that starkly differentiates her opinions from the majority’s constrained, diversity-bound position. Her support for allowing affirmative action programs to be overt in their efforts to combat racial
discrimination is consistent with her general open and transparent
approach to the need for affirmative action programs.

courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to
aid in their own deliberative process. Id. at 1-2 (alteration in original)
(internal citations omitted).
124 Id.
125 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm).
126 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (citing the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, Art.
4(1) (1979), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/).
127 Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, Office of
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, at 11 (2004), available at http://www.un.
org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm; http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
128 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 259.
129 Id. at 260-61. It should be noted that Ginsburg has also written about the implicit support for affirmative action provided by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Id. at 261. She does not, however, include that document in her Grutter and
Gratz opinions, presumably because it is a declaration, not a formal treaty or convention, and therefore does not have the same weight as CEDAW and CERD.
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Loosening the Language of Equal Protection

Ginsburg’s approach to reviewing affirmative action programs
is consistent with her general view of affirmative action as a response to general societal discrimination. She creates a more flexible equal protection standard while remaining grounded in
precedent by referring to certain concepts that characterize prevailing equal protection jurisprudence, but altering her word
choice to avoid the strict formalistic definitions associated with
mainstream equal protection analysis. Thus, Ginsburg describes
the need for “close review” of affirmative action programs as to ensure that they are not malign classifications masquerading as benign and that they do not unduly burden majority groups.130 In
doing so, she invokes the same general concept of heightened review of racial classifications that characterizes prevailing equal protection analysis, yet dispenses with the formalistic baggage that
accompanies such analysis. Moreover, Ginsburg’s standard for what
constitutes an undue burden is more flexible than that of the
majority.
Ginsburg has employed this strategy of relying on conventional equal protection analysis but stretching the parameters of
that analysis by altering her language before. For example, Ginsburg has written that affirmative-action plans should match the injuries to be remedied.131 Ginsburg thereby invokes the concept of
“narrowly tailored” by way of analyzing the targeting programs in
the context of the societal problems they are to remedy, while
evading the loaded connotations of that concept.
Likewise, Ginsburg’s proposed test for affirmative action programs echoes the majority’s concern to avoid unduly burdening
white students,132 but exhibits greater flexibility in addressing that
130 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302. Ginsburg writes that “[c]lose review is needed to ferret
out classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign, and to ensure that
preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or
interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred
groups” (internal citations omitted).
131 Gender, supra note 34, at 29 (noting that “[m]ovement in [the direction of genuine neutrality with respect to sex-based discrimination] . . . requires remedies necessary and proper to alter deeply entrenched discriminatory patterns. But changing
those patterns entails recognition that generators of race and sex discrimination are
often different. Neither ghettoized minorities nor women are well served by lumping
their problems in the economic sector together for all purposes.”).
132 In finding that “the University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the interest in educational diversity[,]” the Court is effectively saying that in
order to survive equal protection review, a race-based affirmative action must give the
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concern. Ginsburg differs from the majority in her belief that the
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy did not
unduly burden white students.133 She also mentioned the need for
this type of test in her dissenting opinion in Adarand, but concluded that the program at issue in Adarand would survive it.134
Recently, Ginsburg has noted that, although affirmative action has
the potential to promote civil and economic rights, its major drawback is that it generates accusations of reverse discrimination.135
However, she does not view this phenomenon as an obstacle like
the majority does, and recommends looking to other countries and
to international human rights law for guidance in navigating these
difficulties.136 While Ginsburg shares the majority’s concern on undue burdening, she differs from it in finding that neither Michigan’s undergraduate nor its graduate affirmative action program
constitutes an undue burden, and therefore sets a more flexible
standard for what constitutes an undue burden.137
The system of affirmative action analysis that Ginsburg advocates is therefore more flexible than the majority’s while adhering
to some of the principles of prevailing equal protection review.
C.

Race-Based and Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Different
Contexts, Common Themes

Ginsburg’s Gratz dissent simplifies and loosens equal protection review by applying a standard for race-based classifications in
affirmative action programs that is analogous to the one she advocates for gender-based classifications. Ginsburg dispenses with the
traditional differentiation between reviews of race-based and gender-based differentiations in favor of applying a similar test to both.
The first part of Ginsburg’s test in Gratz–affirmative action
smallest edge possible to minority students to promote the school’s interest in diversity so as to impose the lowest burden possible on other students. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at
270.
133 Id. at 303 (finding that “there has [not] been any demonstration that the College’s program unduly constricts admissions opportunities for students who do not
receive special consideration based on race”).
134 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “Properly, a majority of the Court calls for review that is searching, in order to
ferret out classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign.” Id.
135 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 281.
136 Id. at 282.
137 Ginsburg’s finding that the university’s affirmative action plan for minority undergraduates did not impact white students’ chances of admission in a statistically
significant way differs from the majority finding that the undergraduate school’s automatic awarding of points to minority candidates was an undue burden on white applicants. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303.
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programs should not be malign classifications masquerading as benign138–is the same as the one she has proposed for gender-based
classifications. Ginsburg has written extensively on the problem of
malignant classifications masquerading as benign in the context of
gender-based classifications. Most of her work as the legal director
of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project and as the lead counsel in a
string of 1970s gender discrimination cases demonstrated that
many of the gender-based classifications that were justified as benefiting women were in fact based on stereotypes about women’s role
as dependents and men’s role as providers.139 Ginsburg argued
that, in the aggregate, such classifications perpetuated stereotypes
that were detrimental to women’s efforts to achieve social
equality.140
Ginsburg’s gender jurisprudence has focused on eradicating
assumptions about people’s capabilities based on their gender.141
Although these cases have been criticized as taking away the few
benefits belonging to women,142 their goal was to destabilize the
system of gender roles.143 Although Ginsburg has been criticized
for opposing benefits for caregivers,144 what she opposes, in reality,
is the use of gender to signify caregiver status.145 She favors benefits
for caregivers, but advocates for creating these benefits as caregiver
benefits, rather than women’s benefits.146
The cases Ginsburg argued with the ACLU challenged benefits that were designed in response to the “ideal worker/marginalized caregiver” dyad.147 For example, Reed v. Reed involved a
challenge to a statute that preferred males as estate administrators
138

Id. at 302.
Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality? 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 301 (1998).
140 Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 821-22.
141 Ray, supra note 51, at 646 (writing, “[t]he rejection of ‘unwarranted assumptions’ about the capacities of individuals has long been central to Ginsburg’s thinking
about women’s rights.”).
142 Williams, supra note 139, at 301-02, notes that Ginsburg and other formal equality feminists have been criticized for not responding to the needs of working class and
single mothers. Ginsburg’s ACLU cases have been criticized for depriving women of
rights or giving men the few benefits formerly accorded only to women. Williams
counters that Ginsburg was not striving to eliminate caregiver’s benefits, only to break
down societal stereotypes about gender roles.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 302-03.
147 Id. at 301. Williams notes that Ginsburg never opposed caregivers’ benefits except in Kahn v. Shevin, a case that Ginsburg did not support, had not hand-picked as
she had the other ACLU cases, and that she only argued for damage-control pur139
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when males and females of the same degree of relationship were
vying for that position.148 Ginsburg argued that giving one gender
preference over another based on gender stereotypes only to further administrative convenience by circumventing the need to
hold hearings on the merits was an arbitrary legislative choice that
violated the Equal Protection Clause.149 Similarly, Ginsburg argued
in Frontiero v. Richardson that a military policy automatically granting military wives housing and medical benefits while requiring
military husbands to affirmatively prove their dependence on their
service member wives was an unconstitutional, detrimental classification that was disguised as a benefit to women but was based on
and perpetuated stereotypes about women’s dependency.150 By way
of a number of other similar cases throughout the 1970s, Ginsburg
slowly chipped away at gender-based stereotypes and convinced the
Court to apply heightened review to gender discrimination
cases.151 She demonstrated that laws that were held out as beneficial to women were, in fact, poorly disguised efforts to perpetuate
stereotypes about women’s roles.
Ginsburg has argued that, because of the history of disguising
detrimental gender classifications as beneficial, the masquerading
problem emerged in the context of gender-based classifications.152
Past lax scrutiny of gender-based classifications led to this problem,
and she demonstrated the need for close review of allegedly positive gender classifications.153 However, Ginsburg has also written
about the masquerading problem in the context of race-based affirmative action. In her dissenting opinion in Adarand, Ginsburg
wrote that the Court appropriately called for close review of racebased affirmative action to weed out programs that may have this
poses. According to Williams, Ginsburg advocates for basing laws on “functional categories” rather than gender proxies. Id. at 302.
148 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
149 See Sullivan, supra note 52, at 739-40; Gender, supra note 34, at 10.
150 See Sullivan, supra note 52, at 740.
151 See supra note 23.
152 Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 814 (“Because of the historical tendency of
lawmakers and jurists to regard virtually all gender-based classifications as designed
for women’s benefit or protection, the notion of affirmative action in the context of
sex presents a special problem.”).
153 Id.; see also Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 35, at 258:
Patriarchal rules long sequestered women at home in the name of
“motherhood,” rather than allowing them to integrate parenthood with
paid labor. It is not always easy to separate rules that genuinely assist
mothers and their children by facilitating a woman’s pursuit of both
paid work and parenting, from laws that operate to confine women to
their traditional subordinate status, and to relieve men of their fair
share of responsibility for childraising.
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quality.154 Ginsburg therefore applied a common test to both gender- and race-based classifications when she wrote in Gratz that affirmative action programs should be reviewed to ensure that they
do not constitute malign classifications masquerading as benign.
Ginsburg’s history of applying the standard articulated in Califano
v. Webster,155 displays her desire to unify the standards of review for
race- and gender-based classifications.
The standard in Califano v. Webster, incorporates what might
be called the “masquerade test.”156 In Webster, the Court upheld a
law that altered the calculation of women’s Social Security retirement benefits to compensate for discrimination-based lower wages
and mandatory early retirement for women as permissible affirmative action.157 The Court’s decision was based on its holding that
legislation that directly and specifically addresses gender-based discrimination and strives to remedy it through affirmative action programs that are closely targeted to the desired end is constitutional.
In contrast, legislation based on stereotypes that does not aim to
remedy discrimination is unconstitutional.158 In other words, Webster requires that affirmative action programs be judged according
to whether they genuinely and specifically redress discrimination,
or whether they are in fact malignant classifications that are based
on and perpetuate stereotypes, in order to eliminate improper classifications.159 This case thus allows for preserving equal treatment
while allowing for genuine compensation for past general
discrimination.
154 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275-76 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
155 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
156 See Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 823 (“Webster . . . attempts to preserve and to
bolster a general rule of equal treatment while leaving a corridor for genuinely compensatory classification.”).
157 See Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977).
158 Id. at 317 (holding that
[t]he more favorable treatment of the female wage earner enacted here
was not a result of archaic and overbroad generalizations about women,
or of the role-typing society has long imposed upon women, such as
casual assumptions that women are the weaker sex or are more likely to
be child-rearers or dependents (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
159 Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 823. Ginsburg writes that
[i]f the Court adheres to the Webster synthesis, it will uphold a gender
classification justified as compensatory only if in fact adopted by the
legislature for remedial reasons rather than out of prejudice about ‘the
way women (or men) are,’ and even then, only if the classification
neatly matches the remedial end.
Id.
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Ginsburg has used the Webster standard in her gender-based
equal protection jurisprudence. She relied in part on the Webster
standard in her opinion in VMI,160 arguing that the VMI establishment of a separate and inferior school for women perpetuated women’s legal, social, and economic inferiority rather than
compensating them for their economic and social disabilities,161
because the separation of the two schools was based on “generalizations about the way women are.”162 Furthermore, the remedy of
establishing a special school for women did not closely fit the violation, nor did it eliminate discriminatory effects, and prevent future
discrimination,163 because it did not afford women equal facilities,
opportunities, or funding. In addition, the substitute school did
not provide women with the unique characteristics of a VMI education or the benefits of a VMI degree.164
In her dissenting opinion,165 Ginsburg also advocated using
this standard to prohibit the gender-based classification involved in
Miller v. Albright.166 In Miller, the 21-year-old Philippines-born
daughter of a Filipino mother and a U.S. Air Force member father
challenged a law that prevented her from being granted citizenship because it required the citizen father of a foreign-born child
with a non-citizen mother to legally attest to paternity before the
child’s eighteenth birthday in order for the child to be eligible to
become a citizen.167 The law did not require this procedure if the
mother was a citizen and the father was not.168 The Court upheld
the classification on the grounds that it applied to a specific set of
circumstances, which was not based solely on gender, and its purposes, to foster the development of a healthy relationship between
the child and the father and to encourage early ties with the
United States, were legitimate.169 In Miller, Ginsburg dissented on
the ground that the statute was based on overbroad stereotypes
160 “Sex classifications may be used to compensate women for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,” citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). United
States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also Morgan, supra note 42, at
105.
161 VMI, 518 U.S. at 533-34.
162 Id. at 550.
163 Id. at 547.
164 Id. at 553.
165 Id. at 460-71.
166 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
167 Id. at 424-26. The challenged statute was 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Id. at 427.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 442-45.
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about men and women’s relationships with their children,170 even
though it appeared to be a form of affirmative action for women
that granted them a benefit not allowed to men.171 She wrote that
the statute should not survive the Webster test because of its reliance
on overgeneralizations.
Ginsburg has previously argued in favor of applying the Webster
test to race-based affirmative action as well.172 She has written that
the Webster standard should be adopted in affirmative action cases
and could have been used by the Bakke Court to uphold the case’s
race-based affirmative action program.173 Under the Webster standard, the program in Bakke would be constitutional because it directly redressed the effects of social and economic discrimination
and it did not involve “historic role-typing nourished by race-based
animus.”174
However, despite her earlier advocacy for adopting the Webster
standard in race-based affirmative action cases, Ginsburg’s Gratz decision uses only half of the standard, the masquerade test, and
omits the part of the Webster test that requires that affirmative action programs be closely targeted to the injury they are striving to
redress. This latter element is related to Ginsburg’s other concern,
which also is not discussed in the context of race in Gratz, namely,
that gender should not serve as a proxy for other characteristics
where it would be possible and more fitting to make a classification
based on gender-neutral characteristics.175 It is impossible to know
170 Id. at 460 (finding that “[o]n the surface, § 1409 treats females favorably. Indeed, it might be seen as a benign preference, an affirmative action of sorts.”).
171 Id. at 469 (holding that “[e]ven if one accepts at face value the Government’s
current rationale, it is surely based on generalizations (stereotypes) about the way
women (or men) are. . . . We have repeatedly cautioned, however, that when the
Government controls gates to opportunity, it may not exclude qualified individuals
based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
172 Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 823-24.
173 Id. Ginsburg wrote that
[t]he line between impermissible adverse discrimination and permissible rectification of past injustice sketched in Webster may well be elaborated in the Court’s resolution of more heated ‘affirmative action’
controversies. In Regents of California v. Bakke, for example, involving an
equal protection challenge by a white male to a state medical school’s
special minorities admission program, the Webster opinion could have
served as a framework for decision.
Id.
174 Id. at 824.
175 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 470-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg
wrote that alleged differences between mothers and fathers do not “justify reliance on
gender distinctions when the alleged purpose–assuring close ties to the United
States–can be achieved without reference to gender.” Id. at 470.
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Ginsburg’s motivation for leaving out the “close targeting” element
of the Webster test. It may be that she omitted it because she did not
find it applicable in the context of race. Or, it may be that social
conditions in the United States are such that minority status is sufficiently correlated with lack of opportunity so that the “masquerade” element alone can justify the classification as constitutional.
Furthermore, Ginsburg may not have considered this part–“close
targeting”–of the Webster test essential, and may have wanted to
avoid constructing extra hurdles for affirmative action programs in
an opinion, and the purpose of this was to promote a more flexible
standard of affirmative action review.
Ginsburg’s race-based standard in Gratz is not entirely less
strict than her gender-based standard because she adds the requirement that race-based affirmative action programs should not
unduly burden the majority, while she has not addressed a similar
concern in the gender context.176 However, as noted above, Ginsburg addresses this concern in the context of race-based affirmative action, because it was a major concern of the majority justices,
and she raises it in order to assert that, unlike the majority, she
finds that Michigan’s affirmative action program did not unduly
burden white students. Therefore, Ginsburg may have added this
standard to her test for race-based affirmative action because the
majority’s concern necessitated her doing so, and she made the
best of it.
Ginsburg also constrains her support of race-based affirmative
action with a qualified endorsement of the majority’s preference
for a sunset clause. She had previously articulated a conception of
both race-based and gender-based affirmative action as a transitional measure to be used during the process of eradicating discrimination and its effects and of achieving full equality.177
However, she loosens this constraint on affirmative action when expressing her doubts that true equality and the retirement of affirmative-action plans will be achieved in the near future. As a result,
the test that Ginsburg applies to race-based affirmative action is
176 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275-76 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
[c]lose review also is in order [because] . . . some members of the historically favored race can be hurt by catchup mechanisms designed to
cope with the lingering effects of entrenched racial subjugation. Court
review can ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of persons in once-preferred groups.).
177 See Gender, supra note 34, at 34; Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at 825. In both
articles, Ginsburg refers to the use of affirmative action during a “transition period.”
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novel in that it is grounded in the standard she endorses for gender-based classifications, even though she adopts it to the concerns
and exigencies of Gratz.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ginsburg adds an important articulation of a less formalistic
view of equal protection to the affirmative action debate. Affirmative action is a complicated issue that rarely lends itself to absolute,
definitive answers. However, the equal protection framework
within which affirmative action cases are currently decided has become so mired in formalistic technicalities that courts cannot help
but lose sight of the issues of racial injustice and discrimination
that are at the heart of the need for affirmative action. The result is
a judicial approach to affirmative action that seems hopelessly out
of touch with the real issues surrounding the subject and is therefore unlikely to reach a satisfying solution to the problem. Against
this backdrop, Ginsburg’s willingness to ground her analysis of affirmative-action plans in a discussion of historic inequality and injustice and to dispense with some of the formalism of the majority
adds a levelheaded, clearly articulated, anti-formalism position to
the affirmative-action debate.

